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At the same time , a compari-
son of treatments, or of treat-
ment with no further curative 
treatments, is objectively relativ~ 
to the patient's present condi-
tion - not to some notion of 
"standard medical care" in a 
physician 's mind . A routinized 
understanding of "ordinary /ex-
traordinary" is the "security 
blanket of som e physicians who 
nevertheless have been known to 
call some ethicists " absolutists"! 
In this article I have been con-
cerned simply with the clarifica-
tion of terms, to the end that the 
prohibition of euthanasia can be 
more fully understood. This is a 
firm principle or moral norm 
that should govern medical care. 
I myself have suggested that 
there may be "exceptions" to 
t he rule against hastening or 
causing or . choosing death.11 A 
littl e flurry of debate once ~wirled around those exceptions. 
1 do not now enter the lists to 
defend them. My point has rath-
er been a far more important 
one, against the trend that is 
clearly evident in contemporary 
discussions to weaken the prin-
ciple prohibiting choosing d~a~h. 
Ldose language, I believe, 1s Its 
source. 
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After reviewing both tradition-
al teaching and traditional Chris-
tian thinking on positive eutha-
nasia, the author attempts to es-
tablish a Christian basis for posi-
tive euthanasia in highly selected 
circumstances. The author and 
editor publish this with the in-
tention of inviting comment 
rather than settling an issue. 
Ms. Cahill is a member of the 
religion department of Boston 
College. 
A ~Natural Law' Reconsideration of Euthanasia 
Lisa Sowle Cahill 
Respect for the value of 
human life and care for its pres-
ervation in a state of physical 
Well -being have traditionally 
motivated the practice of medi-
cine in Western societies. Because 
of the relatively recent but very 
lapid advancement of medical 
technology, it has become com-
monplace to observe that the 
Proper affirmation of that re-
8pect and the adequate fulfill -
ment of that care are perplexing 
ethical issues. It is often no easy 
matter for the physician to deter-
llline how best to honor his obli-
gation "to render service to 
hUJnanity with full respect for 
the dignity of man." 1 
Some of the moral uncertainty 
which surrounds our current per-
ceptions of the relation of the 
sick to the healthy (especially to 
members of the health care pro-
fessions) and to alternative 
courses of treatment, might be 
alleviated by careful reflection 
upon the meaning of "the sanc-
tity of life" and its implications 
for action. Difficult questions 
about life and death ought to be 
considered in light of the totality 
of the human person to whom 
this principle has reference. Bio-
logical life is said to be "sacred" 
because it is a fundamental con-
dition of human meaning. But 
physical existence is not an ab-
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solute value for the human per-
son. What are some conflict sit-
uations in which other values are 
foremost? What kinds of acts are 
compatible both with respect for 
life and with the recognition that 
it is not an absolute? Ought di-
rect euthanasia or "mercy-kill-
ing" always to be excluded from 
such acts, even in cases of severe 
terminal suffering or permanent 
unconsciousness? 
The conviction that human 
life has a value and commands 
respect not comparable to that 
of lower forms of life can be ex-
pre~sed variously and rests upon 
a broad base of support from 
diverse ethical traditions. The 
Judaeo-Christian communities 
have endorsed the principle of 
the sanctity of life because it is 
consistent with a religious belief 
in a God Who creates and pre-
serves human life, and Who im-
poses a moral obligation of life 
to life, consisting in its preserva-
tion and protection. The Roman 
Catholic tradition of Christianity 
in particular has attempted in the 
realm of medical ethics to supply 
this rather abstract principle with 
appropriate moral content. Only 
God has full "dominion" or right 
of control over human life; man's 
dominion over his own life is 
limited. "God is the creator and 
master of human life and no one 
may take it without His authori-
zation."2 Although religious be-
lief in a Divine Maker Who loves 
and sustains personal life pro-
vides a strong warrant · for re-
spect, the principle of the sanc-
tity of life can also be defended 
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on philosophical grounds, b an 
appeal to common human e 1er-
ience. Many an atheisti or 
agnostic humartist .would ree 
that since life is the fundarr 1tal 
and irreplaceable conditic of 
the experience of all huma val-
ues, it is a basic , or the .sic, 
value and must not be des t yed 
without grave cause.3 
In · Catholic medicaJ oral 
theology, the principle the 
sanctity of life has been af med 
not only because it is com tible 
with biblical anthropolog . but 
because it is part of the ~ural 
moral law. As such, it ind tes a 
universal ethical o bl tion, 
known to all men and men, 
not to Christians only . • the 
natural law moral thea r,y of 
Catholicism, the princi ' has 
been given two primary xpres-
sions, one negative and " ' posi-
tive. First, we may cons ~r the 
negative prohibition of t viola-
tion or destruction of l ' , pat-
terned on Thomas f. Jinas's 
arguments against murd .4 It is 
often formulated as, "It i :liways 
wrong directly to kill . inno· 
cent human being."5 "lis has 
been the basis for the " 'lurch's 
stance against abortion .1S mur-
der) and euthanasia (as s ,cide or 
murder or both) .6 Sec nd, we 
have the positive affirm ·1tion of 
respect for the integrity of 
human personhood, also roo~d 
in Aquinas.? It is called "the pnn· 
ciple of totality," the stand~d 
medical formulation of which 
proclaims the proper subordina· 
tion of an organ to the good ~f. 
the body as part to who le. ThiS 
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affinnation of the value of life 
has provided a framework within 
which to justify surgical mutila-
tion of the body (e.g., excision 
of a diseased organ) in order to 
further its total well-being.s The 
intention of the principle of 
totality is to respect and safe-
guard the integrity and welfare 
of the whole human being. 
The referent of the principle 
of totality has usually been the 
life of the human individual con-
sidered as a physical organism. 
However, it can be argued that 
tJ_te fullest meaning of this prin-
Ciple, as it is actually used by 
Catholic theologians writing on 
medical ethics, includes the sub-
ordination of the physical aspect 
of man to the whole "person" 
which also includes his spiritual 
aspect. 
During his pontificate, Pius XII 
addressed himself repeatedly to 
contemporary problems of ethics 
~nfronting the medical profes-
Sions. These teachings are signifi-
cant both because they are ex-
~ressions of "natural law" think-
lllg about medical morality and 
because they were promulgated 
~ authoritative (although not 
infallible) for mem hers of the 
Catholic Church. The principle 
~ ~tality is frequently used in 
Us s analyses of the medical-
:o~ ~ssu~ of which he speaks, 
d 1t Is h1s formulations of that 
~ciple which are most often 
~Yoked by Catholic theologians. 
kn Us XII delivered a now well-
own speech on medical re-
~arch to the First International 
hgress of the Histopathology 
of the Nervous System convened 
in Rome on September 13, 1952. 
Therein he declared that since 
" the parts exist for the whole;• it 
is true of any physical entity that 
"the whole is a determining fac-
tor fo r the part and can dispose 
of it in its own interest."9 There-
fore, " the patient can allow the 
individual parts to be destroyed 
or mutilated when and to the 
extent necessary for the good of 
his being as a whole."lO 
Consideration of the principle 
of totality in its abstract version 
leads us to ask whether the " to-
tality" of a person's "being as a 
whole" can be adequately de-
fined in terms of the "physical 
organism" here mentioned by 
Pope Pius XII. On the contrary, 
Catholic teaching does in fact 
provide a strong basis for describ-
ing human personhood as a total-
ity which is essentially consti-
tuted by the integration of both 
physical and spiritual aspects. 
The Pope himself states in his en-
cyclical The Mystical Body of 
Christ that " the whole of man" 
is not "encompassed within the 
organism of our mortal body ."11 
Perhaps his most forthright 
statement on the matter is given 
in an address to the International 
College of Psychoneuropharma-
cology on September 9, 1958. 
Speaking of medical experimen-
tation, the Pope affirmed that 
" there must be added to the sub-
a rd in at ion of the individual 
organs to the organism and its 
end the subordination of the 
organism itself to the spiritual 
end of the person."12 
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An expanded and perhaps 
more technical version of the 
Pope's view of human person-
hood is given in a 1958 address 
to a Congress of the Internation-
al Asso ciation of A pplied 
Psychology. The self is explicit-
ly described as a "totality" 
having "parts." Says Pius, "We 
define personality as 'the psycho-
somatic unity of man in so far as 
it is determined and governed by 
the soul ' .. . . " 13 Thus in an 
address to the International 
Union Against Cancer, in 1956, 
the Pope feels constrained to 
warn that "before anything else, 
t he doctor should consider the 
whole man, in the unity of his 
person , that is to say, not merely 
his physical condition but his 
psychological state as well as his 
spiritual and moral ideals and his 
place in society. "14 The ques-
tion to be· asked is whether Pius's 
strong concern for the " whole 
man" is consistent with his abso-
1 u te prohibition of euthana-
sia.15 If the body is a "part" of 
the total person, are t here any 
circumstances in which it may, 
through a direct act, be sacrificed 
for the good of the whole? This 
pro b 1 em will bear reflection 
which. goes beyond the past pro-
hibitions of such acts. 
Considering Life and Death 
It is certainly essential to a 
Thomistic version of Roman 
Catholic moral theology to con-
sider human life and d eath in 
view of the final end of the hu-
man person. Consequently , it 
would seem most inconsistent 
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for any theologian who sten· 
sibly stands within that tr~ ition 
t o in te rpret moral d il nmas 
according to· a principle f hu· 
man "totality" which r ~lects 
not only :rp.an 's supematm goal, 
but his natural goal of ature 
integration of body and rit. It 
is this total human natur .vhich 
contemporary Catholic leolo-
gians want to give its pre 
in · co nsiderat ions of 
'r due 
edical 
elated ethics. This concern is 
specifically to the pra ce of 
medicine in the curren . ;thical 
and R e ligious Direc1 ' S {or 
Catholic Health Faciliti. which 
maintains that a Catha • 
tal has a " responsibilit \ 
and protect the total g' 
patients." This good is 
physical one. "The tot< 
the patient, which int 
high~r spiritual as wt 
bodily welfare, is th ~ 
concern of those entrt. 
the management of ~ 
hospi-
o seek 
l of its 
t just a 
!OOd of 
des his 
as his 
primaiY 
.d with 
'atholic 
health facility." 16 Kiel 1 Nolan, 
a priest and theologi ru nvolved 
in pastoral care of th· 'iick, re· 
minds us that if eutha1 .sia is to 
be morally acceptable . must be 
a sign of "the deep ..;hristian 
respect for the in teg1 v of the 
individual." 17 Accord t :: to the 
positive sense o f the -..: '1ctity of 
life principle, the gcv d of the 
totality of an individu ,; 's human 
personhood must be foremost in 
all deliberations abou t his wel-
fare and the obligations of others 
to him in his living and his dying. 
As Nolan sign ificantly puts it, 
"The Christian concern must be 
to provide for human survival 
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and not for mere biological pres-
ervation. "18 
Why is it that the protection 
of biological life is usually con-
sidered to be an essential factor 
in respect for the whole human 
person? Both the negative and 
the positive versions of the sanc-
tity of life principle express an 
insight into the human " right" to 
life and the concomitant human 
"duty" to protect it. An individ-
ual is not to be unjustly deprived 
of his life, and, furthermore, his 
total personal well-being is to be 
promoted. These insights are 
based on the judgment that life is 
the fundamental condition of all 
other human values and is there-
fore to be preserved itself insofar 
as it can ground those values. 
The foremost human value is the 
love of God achieved at least in 
Part through love of other per-
sons. This Christian view of the 
meaning of life as the condition 
of personal love has been given 
consistent expression in the con-
text of Catholic medical ethics. 
~us XII, in "The Prolongation of 
Life," mentions the ultimacy of 
a "higher, m o r e important 
IOOd," the good of love for God , 
over bodily life .19 Thomas J. 
O'Donnell, S.J., observes t hat life 
18 a "relative good" is valuable 
because it is a con text for other 
Yalues which contribute to the ~absolute good," man 's pursuit 
Ill charity of h is supernatural 
~· God.2D Recently, Richard l McCormick, S.J., has em-
p 0Yed a very similar line of argu-
lllent in discussing the life pros-
Pects of defective newborn chil-
dren. He states that life is to be 
preserved only insofar as it can 
ground the highest human good 
of loving relationships with other 
persons. A meaningful life is one 
in which the individual has rela-
tional consciousness and is free 
from physical pain or suffering 
so severe that the sheer effort to 
survive distracts the person from 
the primary human good, love.21 
Because the Christian affirms 
the transcendence of full human 
personhood over sheer biological 
existence, life is for him never an 
absolute value, a value to be sal-
vaged at all costs. Sometimes 
continued life does not consti-
tute a good for a certain individ-
ual because it cannot offer him 
the conditions of meaningful per-
sonal existence. Sometimes the · 
continued life of an individual is 
incompatible with the preserva-
tion of other values which also 
claim protection. In such in-
stances, the Christian does not 
deny that human life is a value to 
be respected. However, he real-
izes that under the finite and sin-
ful conditions of historical moral 
choice, he is called upon respon-
sibly to mediate between con-
flicting values and the rights and 
duties which are devolved from 
them. Occasions of moral choice 
do not always involve clear-cut 
issues and alternatives neatly or-
ganized into a hierarchy of 
ethical preferability .22 While this 
does not remove from us the 
obligation to choose, it does 
forestall false confidence in the 
finality of particular moral judg-
ments and in the ability of the 
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moral agent to avoid responsibil-
ity for the undesirable conse-
quences of a difficult moral 
choice. At times, decisions about 
life and death necessitate arbitra-
tion among competing values 
which cannot all be actualized in 
a given instance. 
Classical examples of ethical 
dilemmas in which this reality 
must be acknowledged are war, 
self-defense, and capital punish-
ment. In these three cases, the 
" right to life" of one individual 
conflicts with the right of anoth-
er individual, or even of the com-
munity, to life itself, or to the 
pursuit of goods still more valu-
able than life, for which life may 
be sacrificed. If we recall the 
standard prohibition of killing, 
we will observe that each in-
stance can be exempted from the 
range of the prohibition because 
the object of the act of direct 
killing can be said in some sense 
not to be " innocent."23 
Even the lives of the innocent, 
however, are not absolutely in-
violable goods. In consistence 
with its concern for the "total 
good" of the person, the Cath-
olic moral tradition affirms that 
preservation of the life of even 
the just man is sometimes not 
the highest value to be main-
tained in a situation of conflict. 
It is clear, however, that in the 
past only indirect killing of the 
innocent has been considered to 
be justifiable. For instance, the 
martyr may allow his physical 
welfare to be negated in order to 
testify to the highest good of 
love for God in Christ. Here the 
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individual permits (but d 
directly cause) his own c 
order to protect a greatP 
The frequent' distinction 
ical ethics between "or 
means of life support (a!' 
tory) and "extraordinary 
(as elective) is given sim 
rants. Death may be p 
(or " indirectly caused") 
holding treatments whic 
serve the best interest~ 
patient. According to th 
definition, a means is n c 
tory if it is difficult to 
or u se, or if it will pro! 
offer much benefit to tb 
in terms of either q · 
duration of life. A t 
need not be used if it 
restore an individual's 
state in which it can su 
development of life '• 
(spiri-tual) goods or VI< 
prevent it from furnisl 
support in the future . ~ 
other hand, a human 
deed worth prolonging 
provide an opportunit~ 
forgetfulness of self i1 
others. Personal relatiof' are that 
for the sake of which li , is to be 
sustained. 
Direct/Indirect Causes <)f Death 
When an innocent pe• son is in· 
volved, an act of killing falls out· 
side the sphere of effica('y of_ th_e 
sanctity of life prohibition If 1~ 
t "25 may be described as "indirec · 
The martyr neither wills n~r 
directly causes his own death ; 1t 
is an undesired consequence of 
his steadfast faith commitment. 
·de Similarly, to omit to provi 
extraordinary life support to a 
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patient is not to directly cause 
his death , but to permit it to 
occur as a result of disease. The 
decision is made in light of the 
judgment that the active pursuit 
of life's continuation is not con-
sistent with concern for and pro-
tection of the total welfare of 
that person. His right to life and 
the physician's concomitant duty 
to preserve it must, in this parti-
cular instance of confli ct, be sub-
ordinated to his "right to die. " 
Life for ·him no longe r provides 
the sufficient conditions for the 
fruitful development of loving 
relationships, both with other 
humans, and through them, with 
God. When extraordinary or ul-
timately useless treatments are 
not used, recognition is given to 
the patient's right to be freed 
from physical and spiritual de-
terioration and suffering and to 
the physician's duty to care for 
his patient's physical well-being 
within the larger context of 
human personhood. This is not 
to say that the patient no longer 
has a right to life or that he may 
be deprived of his life against his 
Will or for the good of any other 
~rson or of society. Both the 
right to life and the right to 
death must be subsumed under 
the promotion of the welfare of 
the whole human person himself. 
In situations where the values of 
life and of death conflict, the 
Patient or his proxy may prefer 
to exercise voluntarily the right 
to die as most appropriate to the 
Patient's own total well-being. 
"R espect" may be shown to a 
Person both by acting in ways 
which express esteem for his or 
h er dignity and by not acting in 
ways which express contemp t for 
or indifference to his or h er dig-
ni ty. What does "respect for life" 
as an ethical principle now mean , 
demand, require in choices about 
death in medical practice? There 
is consensus in theological ethics 
(though perhaps not always in 
medicine) that respect for life 
does not always entail its indef-
inite prolongation. Sometimes 
respect is most adequately con-
veyed by a refusal to intervene or 
to continue intervention in the 
progress of the human organism 
toward biological death. This is 
the main argument of Pius XII in 
"The Prolongation of Life" ; it is 
not a new one in Christian or 
philosophical ethics. 
The "hard question" remains 
and at this juncture unrelentingly 
confronts us : Can respect ever 
mean direct intervention to end 
the life of a patient? (We now 
move from the consideration of 
the morality of an act of omis-
sion to that of one of commis-
sion, to use the technical lan-
guage of moral theology.) It is 
clear that the magisterial Roman 
Catholic rejoinder to this specific 
question has been negative. 26 
Life-sustaining treatments may 
be omitted, but death may not 
be hastened directly. It must 
now be asked whether this posi-
tion in fact m eets the test of con-
sistency with other values ex-
plicitly upheld and protected by 
the Church, such as the value of 
the dignity and welfare of the 
whole human person. 
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It will be recalled that the 
sanctity of life principle in Cath-
olic theology has been given two 
ethically normative expressions. 
Its prohibitive form supplies war-
rants for condemning voluntary 
euthanasia. Its affirmative form 
supplies warrants for respecting 
and promoting the integrity of 
the individual. But can both of 
these conclusions from the more 
generally valid principle of re-
spect for life be observed to-
gether in every particular situa-
tion? Can the obligation not to 
cause death directly and the obli-
gation to respect the goods and 
proper goals of human person-
hood ever be in conflict? If a 
conflict should arise in medical 
practice, which obligation should 
be given preference on the basis 
that it best fulfills the grounding 
principle of life's sanctity? 
Let us consider a possible case, 
one which is very frequently 
mentioned in discussion of 
euthanasia because it appropri-
ately frames decision-making 
about causing death in a context 
of personal agony, both for the 
performer and the recipient of 
the act. A patient with terminal 
cancer is in "the dying proc-
ess."27 The best medical judg-
ment offers a prognosis of only a 
few days' life. He is undergoing 
extreme personal suffering, in-
volving both physical and "spirit-
ual " aspects. Bodily pain is 
intimately related to mental 
stress, to one's total outlook on 
life and to one's ability to make 
the most of biological existence 
as the condition for fully human 
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The first objections n ich will 
be raised against a r .ysician's 
compliance with this n 1uest will 
be directed at the very .,ossibility 
of describing a case in these 
terms. Some will argue hat there 
is always chance of a ~ rong diag-
nosis; examples are recounted of 
"miracle recoveries" in which an 
unexplained remission ensued 
upon the diagnosis of a ' ' hopeleSS 
case" of cancer. Anyone who 
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reflects upon human moral ex-
perience must grant the fallibility 
of all creaturely decision-making. 
Human persons must act, none-
theless, .. o~ the basis of strong 
pro?abihties, acknowledging that 
W~Jle outside possibilities do 
exJst, they do not provide a 
reasonable basis for action in the 
face of far more persuasive evi-
dence. 
ciple . The first furnishes the tra-
ditional prohibition, which de-
scribes voluntary euthanasia as d ' a Irect act to kill a man (oneself 
or another) who is "innocent. "29 
If one views the moral act through 
the lens of this principle, the 
?nly .legitimate killing is that 
m wh1ch either the term "direct" 
does not apply to the act or the 
term "innocent" does not apply 
to the object of euthanasia.30 
Th.is is certainly not to say that a 
dymg patient is "guilty." The 
real question to be considered is 
whether the context of inno-
cence ~~ guilt is an appropriate 
one Withm which to ponder the 
moral character of voluntary 
euthanasia. 
Other Objections 
Others' may object that no 
hu~an being ever has a true 
deSire to die, and with the assist-
ance of a supportive medical 
team and family, will cherish 
even the last few hours of his or 
her existence. Elisabeth Kubler-
R~ss, M.D., has offered plentiful 
evidence on the basis of clinical 
experience that terminal patients 
are able to achieve acceptance of 
an~ readiness for death .28 When 
t~Js information is combined 
With an appreciation of the fact 
~at .critical suffering cannot in 
Circumstances be alleviated 
on · , il e IS abl~ to envision more read-
y a patient who desires death 
~r he has realistically assessed 
IS prospects for human fulfill-
:en~ during the short span left 
hJm. Although most patients 
lllay be able to live meaningfully 
:en during terminal illness·, this 
·:S not negate the responsibil-~ to consider the situation of 
e one who is not able to do so. 
e The moral character of such a 
... -~ admittedly exceptional in 
... 4l<hcal t ' ined . prac Ice, may be exam-
lions m_ terms of the two expres-
01 the sanctity of life prin-
t 1977 
How ought we to interpret the 
negative phrasing of the natural · 
law command to protect the 
individual's right to life? In 
Thomas, the adjective "inno-
cent" refers primarily to the man 
who is " righteous" in the sense 
that he has not forfeited his right 
to. life so that he may . be de-
pnved of it by lawful authority. 
To have lost one's innocence 
means to have injured the com-
mon good.31 · Thus the command 
not to kill the innocent seems 
f~ndame?tally to be a prohibi-
tiOn agamst the deprivation of 
another's life against his will un-
less that other has somehow' for-
feited his right to protection. 
The phrasing of this prohibition 
envisions correlative exceptions 
such as war, capital punishment 
and self-defense. The terms of 
the prohibition make an awk-
ward context within which to 
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approach suicide and euthanasi~, 
where the "innocent" person 1s 
willing.32 
More importantly, since in the 
latter cases the argument is made 
that death is in the better inter-
ests of the person, the language 
of "innocence" vs. guilt, forfeit-
ure, and deprivation is not really 
applicable. The "innocent" man 
is one whose rights, among them 
the "right to life," must be re-
spected. What about a~o.ther 
right also belonging to the nght-
eous man" leading a God-
oriented moral life, the "right to 
death"? Sometimes this right 
contravenes the importance of 
the first right. When this is so, it 
makes little sense to apply the 
word "innocent" out of its orig-
inal context of forfeiture and 
punishment. The individual may 
be "inno·cent" in the sense of 
· "legally or morally blameless," 
but what is the moral relevance 
of this fact? 
It can be granted that the 
dying individual is innocent. 
However, it is the duty of those 
who care for and about him to 
consider that with which he has a 
tight to be provided, as well as 
that of which he has a right not 
to be deprived. There may exist a 
positive duty to support his de-
sire to die, if no conflict exists 
with other overriding rights and 
duties. The central problems are 
deciding, first, whether the duty 
to sustain life or the duty to end 
life is in the concrete case more 
important, and second; what are 
the morally legitimate means of 
upholding the predominant right. 
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In care of the sick, the o blif ttion 
to prolong life is foremosi until 
that point at which an ir livid· 
ual's life no ·longer offers t him 
or her the opportunity t nur· 
ture relationships as life's !ntral 
endeavor. It has tradit •nally 
been gran ted that "h Jeless 
cases" have, in such • :cum· 
stances, a right to die " ich it 
may be the duty of o t ~rs to 
support by withholding c with· 
drawing extraordinary m ;ms· of 
treatment. Can the righ co die · 
ever justify direct killing' )oes a 
terminal p~tient have a ght to 
death which in some case entails 
a duty on the part of >se en· 
trusted with his care t hasten 
positively its arrival? 
Principle of Life's Sa tity 
This brings the d isc1 ,ion to 
the affirmative expressi · of the 
principle of life's sanc t Y · What 
does it mean to respec1 tnd pro· 
teet the life of a dyin person? 
First, Kieran Nolan has ··marked 
that a patient in the l ,t phas~s 
of a terminal illness m · " be said 
to be oriented toward death. as 
the appropriate goal of '1is exist· 
ence, just as the he .. lthy are 
appropriately orien tee· ~ow~~ 
continued life.33 Death IS ~ 
the natural end of the biologtcal 
organism. Although the de~th 0~ 
a human as a persona! bemg 
not a good in itself, it still ma~ 
be understood as a mediate ~ 
. . t' an ill 
necessary goal of the Chn.s 1 d 
his hope for eternal life m ~0 t 
Secondly the terminal patien 
' for who may be a cand idate .. 
euthanasia is one who is suffenng 
both physically and spirituallY or 
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even "morally" in the sense of 
proximity to sin. In the first 
place, personal integration is 
threatened with degeneration. 
Physical pain, accompanied by 
mental exhaustion or sedation, 
often makes it difficult to sustain 
a vital concern for the needs of 
loved family members and 
friends. Furthermore, as Pius XII 
has stated, "suffering can also 
furnish occasion for new faults."34 
Nolan concurs that prolonged 
physical-and mental torment can 
conduce to rebellion against God 
or despair. 
Death for the Christian is 
never an unambiguous good, but 
it is sometimes a lesser evil than 
the evil of suffering, and is for 
the Christian a good in a limited 
but positive sense.35 If in the 
light of these considerations, it is 
&greed that death is a good for a 
Pll'ticular suffering and dying 
P&tient here and now, and if 
death will not follow quickly if 
treatment is ended, then can vol-
untary euthanasia ever constitute 
a legitimate moral option? From 
the evidence thus far (evidence 
1rhich must be verified in every 
case from consideration of the 
lituation of a particular individ-
ual), it would seem so. Life is not 
~value to be preserved absolute-
·¥· Sometimes it must yield to 
~!eater values. If death is for this 
Person the better alternative 
there exists sufficient reason fo; 
~in~ it.36 Deliberately-caused 
-.th 1S not so great an evil that 
it can never be outweighed by 
lh!ater goods. 
The usual and most well-
founded argument against volun-
tary euthanasia in even excep-
tional cases is made in terms of 
social consequences. It is not 
based on the alleged immorality 
of the individual act. The act 
itself may be conceded to result 
in desirable consequences for the 
patient, consequences which it 
would, in fact, be the responsibil-
ity of others to hasten directly, 
were it not for the evil long-range 
effects of such an act. However, 
it is argued that it is wrong to 
commit any act which, while 
good in itself, would lead to 
eventual consequences whose evil 
character would be dispropor-
tionate to the initial good. This 
venerable rejoinder is called the 
"wedge argument," a contempo-. 
rary proponent of which is 
Richard McCormick.37 
McCormick agrees with those 
who are convinced that "the 
direct causing of death involves 
dangers, especially for the living, 
not associated with conservative 
procedures .... "38 Thus he gives 
a "prudential validity" to a rule 
against euthanasia of a "virtually 
exceptionless" sort. Direct killing 
as a premoral evil would be justi-
fied were there sufficient reason, 
but the reasons in favor of eutha-
nasia in concrete cases are out-
balanced by the reasons against 
instituting euthanasia as a general 
practice. McCormick believes 
that an immediate act, perhaps 
morally justifiable " in itself," is 
to be refrained from because of 
consequences such as an attitu-
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dina! decrease in mercy and sen-
sitivity on the part of the hospi-
tal staff, or the ambiguities in-
herent in the procedures of ascer-
taining consent, etc. 
This argument is a forceful 
one, but it need not signal the 
end of the discussion. Although 
McCormick has enumerated real 
dangers, he has not eradicated 
the problem with which any pro-
po sed wedge argument must 
deal, i.e. , whether the long-term 
effects of an act ought to have 
the same moral importance as 
the immediate effects of an act. 
In cases where the latter are very 
certain and unavoidable, the 
former may be relatively uncer-
tain b ecause further moral 
choices (by others who share 
responsibility) will have to inter-
vene in order either to actualize 
or to prevent the anticipated 
·danger. 
Traditional Catholic morals 
have held that it is always wrong 
to cause a moral evil in order to 
achieve a moral good or to pre-
vent another moral evil even if it 
is greater. We also have a respon-
sibility to try to avoid even that 
moral evil for which we are not 
directly responsible. Some ethi-
cists have suggested that, at least 
in some cases, to refuse to hasten 
the death o f a grossly suffering 
terminal pat ient is to permit, if 
not cause, in extreme cases, a 
moral evil - the despair of the 
dying man or woman.39 Even in 
less severe cases, there is fre-
quently present the clear spirit-
ual, or personal, evil of mental 
ennervation and distress, and of 
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inability to escape the c i le of 
suffering which encloses f I lim· 
its all efforts to transcend teself 
in concern for others. Th: 
moral evil in the sense 
but it is a clear disvalue 
whole human person < 
posed of both body and · 
It is a violation of the 
and m eaning of human e2 
s not 
sin, 
'r the 
com· 
)irit." 
rpose 
.ence. 
tween 
moral 
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r than 
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n addi-
ealistic 
r fully 
1ention 
degen-
e of an 
,ctually 
. reason 
1 t evil, 
arrower 
ter cer-
avoid an 
Aquinas distinguishes 
a certain and an uncerta 
evil; there exists a greate 
sibility to avoid the fon 
the latter. 40 In the case 
n asia, there are two 
dangers of moral evil , tr 
pat ient if the act is 
formed, and that to fu tt 
ations if it is performec1 
tion , there is the mar• 
threat to personality, 
persqnal spirit, not to 
the physical evil of bod 
eration. Does the avoid; 
un certain future evi 1 
constitute a proportion. 
for permitting a pr€' 
which , while of much 
scope, is of much gr-
tainty? Is the failure tC' 
immediate moral evil , 
loss of faith in the 
tch as a 
·ultimate 
meaning of life, or e 1 excru· 
ciating and prolongeP spiritual 
and physical evil , sue· as con· 
scious suffering or ut onsciou_s 
degenerat ion, sufficier d y justi-
fied by the "proportwnate rea· 
son " of avoidance of the danger 
(not the certainty) of future 
moral evil ? In fact, this future 
evil seems more than the present 
one to be described most ac-
curately as " permitted" rather 
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than "caused." This is to say that 
our moral responsibility for the 
attitudes toward death of fu ture 
physicians, etc., is more indirect 
than is our responsibili ty for the 
total personal distress (moral, 
mental, and physical) of our 
neighbor suffering here and now 
and immediately dependent 
upon our care. 
I believe the usual criticism of 
the wedge argumen t has force 
against its use in the condemna-
tion of euthanasia. The opp osing 
contention is that each act must 
~ judged right or wrong primar-
~ly _in itself and only secondarily 
m Its relation to other acts. " In 
itself" does indeed include ef-
fects, and it is admittedly diffi-
cult t o draw a line around the 
more " immediate" o nes. But the 
range of effects of an act cannot 
be extended indefinitely o r the 
very meaning of a discrete "occa-
sion of m oral choice" is dissi-
pated to t h e point of dis-
appearance. 
In addition , the social effects 
of the wedge will more likely be 
cut short where there is a stand-
ard by which to differentiate the 
first case from other similar but 
m_orally distinct cases. 41 The 
ltipulation that a candidate for 
euthanasia be "in the dying pro-
cess" is such a standard and a 
relat_ively clear one, tho~gh its 
lpphcation is not in every case 
~~~~--~ly unambiguous. There is a 
lllarked difference between 
~hanasia for those dying and in :n and eu_thanasia for the sick 
11 not dymg, for the socially leless, for the insane, etc. , 
which can be judged by a rela-
tively objective standard. Where 
such a criterion is available we 
must at least say that the " fu ture 
danger" becomes more " uncer-
tain." Anothe r standard is the 
one McCormick offers as a justi-
fication for permitting death to 
occur, that of relational con-
sciousness. Such a standard 
might apply also the patient with 
a grossly damaged neocortex, 
whose vital functions are still 
maintained spontaneously by the 
brainstem . The prolonged and 
meaningless physical deteriora-
tion of a permanently comatose 
individual can be construed as an 
insul t to his or her total person-
hood. In such a case, as well as 
that of the dying person, eutha-
nasia may present a viable moral 
option. Once a patient is in the · 
terminal stage of a fatal illness or 
is permanently comatose, it may 
become evident that his or her 
life is past the point of possible 
restoration to a quality which 
would support significant pursuit 
of the highest human values. 
Christian Respect for Life 
This discussion of m oral 
responsibilities of and toward the 
dying does not represen t a com-
prehensive grasp of the problem 
bu t ra t her an indication of 
appropriate ways to think about 
it. Through a consideration of 
Christian respect for the sanctity 
o f human life, which is ultimate-
ly a concern for the good of the 
total person , I have tried to in-
dicate that some relatively lim-
ited number of cases may consti-
tute an arena of moral choice 
59 
about euthanasia. 42 Life can fail 
to constitute a sufficient condi-
tion for the fulfillment of human 
value in either the presence of 
gross suffering or the absence of 
consciousness. These circum-
stances are predictably perma-
nent if one is in the dying proc-
ess or is irretrievably brain-
damaged. It is at this point that 
the prospect of a choice about 
euthanasia arises. Such choices 
would involve only terminal or 
comatose patients for whom it is 
impossible to continue to pursue 
those human values for which 
the Creator intended life to serve 
as the condition. Every such 
choice must be informed by an 
authoritative respect for the dig-
nity of human life as God's 
image and by the intent to pro-
tect that dignity. It is essential to 
remember that no such choices 
can be free-from ambiguity, since 
death is never an unambiguous 
good. In particular, it is neces-
sary to repudiate any attempt to 
define circumstances in which 
there always exists a moral ob-
ligation to perform an act of 
euthanasia. There is no definable 
"class" of patients for whom 
eu,thanasia is the only morally 
responsible alternative. 
Most importantly, it must be 
made clear that there weighs on 
the community of fellow human 
beings, of which the dying 
patient is a member, the obliga-
tion to exhaust every resource in 
an effort to make the last phase 
of that patient's life positively 
meaningful. This obligation es-
pecially impinges upon the 
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Christian, if love is in an~ 
to be taken as normative f1 
duct. At least it must t 
ceded that - euthanasia 
always to be a final resort , 
option to be considered 
all others have been expl 
goes without saying that 
stipulation ensures that at 
candidates for euthanasi~ 
few. We may say with co1 
that euthanasia would be 
wrong where it is an a< 
deprives an individual c 
opportunity to live wit 
offering relationships t c 
In such a case, euthanas 
not be in the best inter• 
patient, since life coul 
further value to him or t 
Jthers. 
would 
of the 
be of 
In general, euthanasi 
avoided or rejected on 
of what is common!' 
"the 'sanctity of life ~ 
Human life has an inhc• 
s to be 
1e basis 
termed 
'1Ciple." 
1t claim 
to respect. In certair circum· 
stances, however, other onsider· 
ations come into play ~· .ich may 
influence persons to manifest 
respect by causing d ... t h. Life 
may cease, in some sen 2 , to be a 
"good." It may inhib1t or pre-
vent the pursuit of hun. an values 
instead of providing conditions 
conducive to their fu lf1ll ment. In 
addition, the continuat ion and 
development of a personal life 
history may lose considerable 
w e ight as a real alternative 
among others if terminal illness 
promises to critically abbreviate 
the life in question. A positive 
"choice" to end life in such a 
case is not a choice of significant· 
continuation of life or of death 
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but a choice of immediate death 
or of a wait for impending death. 
In such situations, the positive 
value of death may gain the 
ascendancy over the negative 
value, although both are always 
co-present. It must be said that 
euthanasia may not be justified 
because death is ever a value, 
right, or goal which can clearly 
cancel out the value of life. It 
must be said that euthanasia is 
never justified because the obli-
gation of the living to the dying, 
or of the individual to attempt to 
live meaningfully, is ever ended. 
In the resolution of these con-
fticts of value, the overriding 
concern must be t he good of the 
patient himself or herself, who is 
the primary subject concerned. 
When conditions preclude the 
patient's voluntary selection of 
an option, that selection must be 
made on the basis of h is or her 
own benefit and inferred inter-
ests. If these interests are as-
leSsed on the basis of a Christian 
anthropology which views the 
human being as a body-soul 
entity, then the primary consid-
eration in life and death deci-
sions in medical practice will be 
tbe good of the whole human 
~on, not simply the perpetua-
t~on of physical existence. 43 
8111ee the distinctive and control-
ling element of human nature is 
the personal self or spirit, t hen 
ICcording to the principle of 
~ty, the body which is a 
~" may in some cases be sac-
~lficed for the good of the 
d~hol~" body-soul entity. Even 
llect Intervention as a final op-
tion will not necessarily entail 
diminishing communal protec-
tiveness toward human life's 
sanctity, if death is encompassed 
reluctant ly and with a profound 
(and Christian) reverence for the 
personal existence within which 
it is an event. 
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